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FOREWORD
In the past, Imperial and Soviet Russia played an active
role in Asia. This is no less true for the current Russian
republic. While Western analyses and policies may downplay
Russia's presence in Asia, Russian leaders do not. In Asia,
Russia exercises an important influence on regional developments.
No less important is the way which policymakers in Moscow
perceive their tasks and goals in Asia. These views will
profoundly affect the further development of Russia's internal
political, military, and economic structures.
This monograph offers an account of the current struggle
inside Russia over Asian policy and of the direction of that
struggle. The author describes the dominant Russian viewpoints on
policy in Asia. Current proponents of an Asian policy based
primarily upon military considerations seem to hold sway.
Advocates of this approach downplay economic integration with
Asia, view other states mainly in terms of threat, favor an
alliance with China rather than merely friendly relations, openly
take a hard line with Japan, and minimize the threat of North
Korean nuclear proliferation. Should this view prevail, Russian
cooperation with Washington will be difficult, tensions with
Japan will remain (if not grow), and Russia's efforts to become a
democratic and economically competitive player will be impeded.
Since Asia is the most dynamic sector of the global economy,
Russian developments, insofar as they affect this region, have a
deep significance for the future of Russia and Asian
international affairs and security.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
analysis of critical developments in an increasingly vital region
of world affairs.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Russia continues to play a significant role in Asian
international affairs even though U.S. policy now minimizes
Russia's importance to Asian issues. Russian elites are intensely
struggling over Asian policy. In this struggle we can identify
two rival views: an economic one and a military or militarizing
one. In the former, Asian states are potential economic partners
and Russia should seek domestic reform and international economic
integration, mainly with Japan, to enter into Asia's dynamic
economy. This view also stresses friendship with China and more
active efforts against nuclear and missile proliferation,
especially in North Korea. The latter sees Asia as hostile,
fixates on a U.S.-Japanese threat, and renounces both cooperation
and the settlement of the outstanding territorial dispute with
Japan. Instead, it favors alliance with China on grounds of
Realpolitik against both Japan and the United States, and
ideologically on the basis of an authoritarianism that "works,"
provides economic growth, respect for the military, and "order."
Finally, this view's adherents dismiss North Korean nuclear
proliferation except where it may lead Japan to follow suit.
The danger inherent in the latter view is that it has taken
the form of military intervention in politics. This intervention
openly displays the fact that the military has escaped close
civilian control and engages in overtly provocative activities to
derail rapprochement with Japan. To cement their position in
Russian politics and to retain the primacy of the military
viewpoint in Far Eastern policy specifically and security policy
more generally, advocates of this position have offered a
comprehensive, but in many ways dubious, strategic rationale for
the pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese stand.
Although nobody disputes the need for a friendly China, an
alliance with it is not what the reformers want, especially at
the expense of close relationships with Japan. Clearly the
adherents of the military viewpoint seek to retain the ability to
threaten Japan and establish an impregnable maritime security
zone around Russia even when no U.S. or Japanese threat is
discernible. Although they want the United States to restrain
Japan, they also demand that the U.S. Navy, in effect, abdicate
its strategic superiority in antisubmarine warfare in the Pacific
as the price of rapprochement with Japan. This is a most unlikely
outcome, for it is the United States which benefits most from
Russo-Japanese tension and sees no reason to yield its position
for Russia's benefit.
Russia's developing Asian policy will lead to diminished
relations with Southeast Asia and India and could encourage
antireform elements at home. Thus security policy in Asia and the
fate of Russian reform are linked inextricably. Implicitly,
Russian Asian policy must be reoriented if Russia is to overcome
its distorted historical legacy and fully participate in the new
Asia. For this reason the United States only injures its own
v

interests if it does not pay close attention to the trends in
Russia's Asian policy.
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THE NEW RUSSIA IN THE NEW ASIA
Introduction.
Russia remains a key player in Asian security, although U.S.
thinking about Asia tends to ignore Russia's Asian presence and
its impact. The Bush and Clinton administrations' formal policy
statements on Russia and Asia do not mention Russia in the Asian
context. Often scholars writing on U.S. policy in Asia and/or
Asian security issues also omit Russia from their analysis.1
But Russian policymakers do not make this mistake even
though they generally acknowledge that Russia's (and the USSR's)
failure to bring its full weight (or potential) to bear in Asia
lies at the root of this neglect. Russia's Asian role remains
incomplete relative to its economic potential, and current
economic conditions inhibit more serious and deeper linkages with
Asia. Russia still stands apart from Asia's amazing dynamism. But
as philosophers tell us, an absence is also a presence. Therefore
no account of Asian prospects that ignores Russia's potential and
its unique realities can be adequate to either subject.
Russia's government and political class have never ignored
their Asian connection. Political struggles in 1992-93 over
foreign policy revolved around the degree to which the government
took sufficient account of those interests in Asia, not whether
there were any. Nobody argued that Russian interests in Asia were
marginal. From Yeltsin down, political figures openly proclaimed
the aim of enhancing Russia's position and national interests.2
Russia's Strategic Options in Asia.
However, Russia's real problem in Asia is choosing between
two fundamental and incompatible approaches in both its Asian and
overall foreign policy posture. These approaches may be labelled
as the militarized and the economic approaches. Two recent
articles in the Russian and Asian press exemplify these rival
approaches. In the first article, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, First
Deputy Commander in Chief of Russia's navy, stated in Vladivostok
that nuclear dumping would continue in the Sea of Japan's
enclosed waters, only 200 miles from Japan. Although Prime
Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin had banned it, the dumping would
continue because the Admiral is "confident that Chernomyrdin's
veto is a purely political move designed to please Japan and that
the government will soon give permission for another dumping of
radioactive waste."3 The second, economic, approach to Asia
appeared in a Radio Vladivostok transmission of October 21, 1993.
Shinichi Kobayashi, deputy general director of
Japan's development institute, made a sensational
statement during his visit to Vladivostok. According
to him, the Tumen River project that has caused such
a stir was proposed by some UN specialists who
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failed to take Russian interests in the Asia Pacific
region into account, and thus it has no future. He
also said that Japan was willing to propose a more
acceptable project which would turn Vladivostok into
a pillar of Russian integration on the Pacific
coast.4
The difference between these two approaches is not merely
that the military one brusquely offends Japan and the economic
one promotes unprecedented Russo-Japanese efforts towards greater
regional integration. Much deeper differences go further and have
profound significance for Russia in Asia. First, Kasatonov's
statement came as a "complete surprise" to Foreign Ministry
officials.5 His confidence in defying and dismissing his
government's policy illustrates a fundamental structural crisis
of Russian security policy. As Pavel Felgengauer, the respected
defense correspondent of Segodnya, told a U.S.-Russian conference
in California in November 1993, the armed forces may be under
commanders' operational control; but commanders, officers, and
troops are by no means under the government's strategic command
and control.6 Although much of the concern about this phenomenon
has focused on Europe or the Caucasus, it is no less important in
Asia. Kasatonov's remarks and the dumping may also have been part
of a deeper political campaign by military elements to undo the
positive results of Yeltsin's October 1993 visit to Japan.7 These
remarks indicate the armed forces' continuing intervention in
politics.
Throughout 1992-93 the armed forces successfully and
publicly intervened in the discussion over the fate of the
Southern Kurile Islands. These islands are the central question
in relations with Japan (Japan calls them the Northern
Territories, a term which for obvious reason Russia shuns). The
Russian military mobilized parliamentary and public opinion
against concessions to Japan, using arguments that, if analyzed
carefully, are strategically questionable.8 This intervention
helped torpedo two proposed Yeltsin visits to Japan and
constrained opportunities for serious discussions when he finally
went. Yet these intrusions went unpunished. Thereby encouraged,
the military hard-liners continue to undermine civilian authority
and official diplomacy while conducting their own truculent and
provocative anti-Japan policy.9 Some civilian analysts even
believe that Admiral Kasatonov deliberately aimed to upstage the
government.10
Kasatonov's insubordination and his arrogant disdain for
civilian authority showed a blunt disregard for the broader
implications of his actions for national interests. Unfortunately
they continued the tradition of casting Russia's Far East
interests in essentially military terms. Traditionally, the
military view has been that the region is constantly threatened
by enemies, particularly by the United States, Japan, and China.
In addition, the military has adopted a visibly racist attitude
toward Japan and China. Today Japanese concerns are regarded with
2

a combination of fear and (visibly) arrogant disdain, while the
Far Eastern region is seen basically through the prism of
potential military scenarios.
The economic approach sees regional integration and joint
cooperation as Russia's fundamental Asian-Pacific objective and
recognizes, that 1) the Far East, in Chernomyrdin's words, is the
"gateway" to the Asian, if not world, economies, 2) to join these
economies, reconciliation with Japan is indispensable, and 3)
failure to join that economy spells disaster for Russia. Far from
deliberately provoking Japan, this policy's advocates seek to
resolve outstanding disputes and to lessen mutual suspicions in
the interests of both sides. They do not view the Asia Pacific
Region (APR) in zero-sum terms of warfare or of `ontological'
enemies. Instead economic integration in Asia benefits everyone.
Almost every civilian analyst understands that the economic
development of Siberia, the Maritime Provinces, and Russian Asia
in general is the precondition for any effective Russian role in
Asia's economy and politics. Otherwise Russia will not be taken
seriously in Asia.11 Therefore Russian statesmen should devise
appropriate policies and institutions to facilitate economic
development and international integration. A 1991 Soviet study,
The Russia Far Eastern Economic Yearbook, reflected this
standpoint, its continuing stress on ties to Japan, and the
broader vision of a cooperative multilateralism in Northeast
Asia. The authors wrote that,
In this connection a special role of Japan in the
economic development of the Far East should be
mentioned. Under the conditions of the Soviet policy
alteration Japan, with its powerful industrial,
technological, and financial potential, as it seems,
should play the leading part in the development of
multilateral cooperation. First of all it means
setting up of the economic zone "Sea of Japan" in
the North-East of Asia which could involve the
economy of the Soviet Far East, the North-East of
China, People's Democratic Republic of Korea, South
Korea, Taiwan, and other interested countries.
Realization of this project will contribute to the
development of not only bilateral but also
trilateral and multilateral cooperation, it will
give a new impetus to the development of the
Soviet-Japanese economic ties.12
Contending Russian Approaches to Asian Issues.
This divergence between the economic and militarizing
approaches to Asia finds expression in tangible policy
differences on outstanding regional security issues. While both
sides agree that nuclear proliferation in North Korea is a
serious political matter having repercussions for Russia should a
war or more intense crisis develop, Russian generals discount
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Pyongyang's possession of nuclear weapons as having little
serious strategic significance for Russia or for regional
strategic and military balances. Therefore they do not take that
threat too seriously.13 Krasnaia Zvezda cited Russia's Foreign
Intelligence Service in stating that there was serious reason to
doubt a North Korean `breakthrough' to produce nuclear weapons.
The article's author concluded that Pyongyang `cooked up' the
nuclear question to continue mobilizing the population while
Washington did so to combat communism. However,
What is bad is that the lack of clarity surrounding
this problem on the Korean Peninsula could prompt
other East Asian countries to embark on the same
nuclear arms race. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan
are already being talked about in this context.14
Obviously the military's main concern is a nuclear Japan,
either within the umbrella of the U.S. security treaty, or if it
breaks down, on its own. In that case, their fear is that Japan
would probably go nuclear or come under great pressure to do
so.15 Although preventing a nuclear arms race in Asia is a shared
goal, the view that the current crisis is `cooked up' solely for
political reasons represents the military's suspicion of the
United States and Japan. The militarized view's spokesmen also
oppose pressing Pyongyang too hard with sanctions. Rather, they
maintain that on this issue it is more important to come close to
China's position.16
This article's author also opined that this crisis provides
an opportunity to launch an Asian version of the Helsinki
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In this process
Russia would naturally be invited to play a leading role in
determining any outcome to the Korean crisis.17 These are old,
one-sided proposals to leverage Russia's military power so Russia
will be taken seriously in Asia and to constrain U.S. and
Japanese policies. At recent Russo-Japanese military meetings to
create confidence-building measures, Russia's delegation called
for a CSCE and Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) process like
Europe's. Furthermore, Major General Anatoly Lukyanov stated that
Russia wanted multilateral collective security in all regions.18
Everything that has been written on Soviet and now Russian
proposals along these lines indicates that these proposals (which
go back to Brezhnev) have as their aim both the inclusion of
Russia in Asian affairs and the ensuing diminution of the
U.S.-Japan alliance in favor of some amorphous collective
security system.19 Rather than build Asian security from below as
many have argued, Russia continues to push the same one-sided
proposals which are visibly anti-Japanese in nature. That these
proposals are targeted against the U.S.-Japanese alliance is
obvious from the statement by V.N. Bunin of the Academy of
Sciences holding that the U.S.-Japanese alliance must no longer
be directed against any countries in the region.20 But calling
for such processes also implies disregarding other states'
security, particularly Japan's. Thus the Russian military
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delegation to Tokyo apparently avoided discussing Japan's primary
security concern, North Korean nuclear proliferation.21
Russia's call for a CSCE type system disregards the efforts
of Asian states. It seeks to pre-define for them the parameters
of security, thus showing little grasp of what is required of
Russia for full participation in Asian security. Moreover, what
really is intended here is that Japan be deprived of its security
anchor and subsumed under Russian control while its concerns are
ignored. This is not a viable basis for either enhancing Asian
security or Russian integration into it.
Therefore, the nonproliferation crisis apparently offers
military grounds for Russia to float long-standing and long
rejected initiatives to join the area's security agenda. These
proposals, either advanced or implicit in the militarizing
approach, reflect Russia's continuing inability to play an active
role in Asia on a nonmilitary basis, fear of U.S.-Japanese
policies, and the danger that Russia might even be shut out of
the defense and security agenda on its own borders. Some old
thinkers even decry the loss of contacts with Pyongyang brought
on by the recognition of Seoul and the abrogation of the old
treaty with the DPRK. They wish to resume selling arms there,
ostensibly to regain an audience and some leverage.22
For the adherents of the economic approach, proliferation in
and of itself and any further nuclearization of Asia constitute a
threat to Russia regardless of their origin. Russia's Ambassador
to Seoul, Georgii F. Kunadze, stated that Russia's principled
position is absolute objection to the presence of nuclear weapons
on the Korean peninsula (this also includes U.S. systems whose
absence obviously enhances Russian security).23 These figures
view North Korea's gambit and the world's response not as a bluff
but as a serious potential crisis with dangerous regional
implications. For example, Vadim Makarenko wrote that Russia
cannot remain impartial about Chinese nuclear testing because of
the danger of an arms race and nuclear proliferation.
For Russia, moreover, with its sparsely populated
Siberia and Far East, and its sharply decreasing
capacities for maintaining large conventional armed
forces, guarantees of nuclear security are becoming
vitally necessary. This makes Russia extremely
interested in the nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons in the world.24
The differing perspectives on nuclear proliferation in Asia,
and on various states and their policies, do not mean that each
side is utterly insensitive to the other. The primacy of the
United States and China, and the relative downgrading of both
India and Japan, are common to both groups for sound geopolitical
reasons since China is on Russia's border. Both sides, for
instance, argue for denuclearizing Korea, if only to get U.S.
systems out. Rather, it is a question of defining Russia's
5

interests, the nature and source of threats to it, differing
sailencies of various issues, and different institutional
responsibilities. When sponsors of the military approach look at
Asia they first see the strategic and military threats, not
economic opportunities. Those come afterwards. The adherents of
the economic approach reverse the process. First they perceive
the economic challenges and opportunities that either are open to
Russia or that it is losing through mistaken policies. Only then
do they concentrate on military issues.
Accordingly Russia can only resolve the direction of its
Asian policies by first determining its internal identity and
direction. By the end of 1993, a converging approach between the
military and the diplomats on major security issues evidently
came into being.25 That consensus apparently has formed around
the militarized approach. But since Russia has not yet
consummated a breakthrough to a new, stable, and legitimate
democratic order or government, Russia has yet to establish for
itself the attributes of stable and predictable policies either
in economics or on broader security issues that characterize a
security community.26 Until then foreign and defense policies
will remain objects of fierce contention and debate will
continue.
Russia's Instability and Asian States.
Meanwhile, Russia's instability reinforces skepticism about
its claims of goodwill or ability to act in the new Asia. Asian
states cannot suspend their policies and wait for Russia to
define its course. For that reason Russia's effort to get Asian
states to say that it is a legitimate and full player in vital
issues is a self-defeating process. If Russia must insist that it
has that status, it only shows that Russia lacks standing in
Asia. Russia will then have to insist all the louder that it is a
player or try and force the agenda to the issues where Russia
fulfills that role: raw military power. That line of action will
only further compound its isolation from Asia. Russia's absence
from the important Seattle APEC meetings in November 1993
signifies that "absence" from Asia's economic revolution and
overall security agenda which are preconditions for joining Asia.
Russia's instability also feeds Asian communist hopes that a
more undemocratic Russia might yet emerge. Reports from Hong Kong
allege that China's government and Party privately supported the
anti-Yeltsin forces in October 1993. In addition, there are solid
grounds for suspecting prior Chinese collusion with, or prior
knowledge of, the coup in August 1991, especially among the
military.27 In closed speeches, mass media, and propaganda
publications for party officials in civilian and military
institutions, an anti-Yeltsin line emerged.28 China's President
and General Secretary of the Communist Party, Jiang Zemin,
reportedly described Russia's experience as gun barrel
determinism and depicted the October 1993 confrontation as a mere
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power struggle. His point is that when any state is threatened
the armed forces determine the outcome. In effect, he made an
apologia for the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989.29 Party
Secretary and Politburo member Ding Guangen went still further.
He, too, saw events as merely a power struggle and concluded that
Russia will become still more unstable in the future.
The bloody military conflict which was an outcome of
the power struggle, will have a negative impact on
the future political stability in Russia and will
cause more obstacles to the economic and political
reforms. The army played a decisive role in this
round of power struggle and, in the future, it will
have a bigger role in deciding the government and
the core leadership level, playing a guiding
function.30
Given the closeness and authoritarian and ideological
congruence of the two militaries, the political autonomy of the
Russian military, and the extent of Russo-Chinese arms transfers
where the two military systems interact, these observations could
become profoundly important and disturbing in the not too distant
future.
Other consequences of Russia's erratic course are equally
important for Asia. First, Russia's instability reinforces
non-Communist Asian inclinations to look to Washington as
guarantor of last resort. Second, the possibilities of an
antireform coalition coming to power, or that Russia may collapse
into a violent civil war, restrain Asian Communist leaders from
carrying out the political reforms needed to reduce fears of
their foreign ambitions. North Korea and China undoubtedly would
prefer some renovated form of ideological solidarity with Russia
if it were available both for its own sake and to reinforce
purely Realpolitik considerations of national interest.
Domestic Politics and Russia's Asian Policies.
Resolution of Russia's fundamental domestic issues must
precede the determination of a strategic direction (or
directions) for Russian policy in Asia. This policy, however it
develops, must include a coherent economic program to revitalize
Siberia and the Russian Far East (Primorskii Krai or the Maritime
Provinces). Observers still see an uncoordinated and unstrategic
pursuit of momentary tactical advantage at the expense of a
steadier, more strategic course in Asia. Nuclear dumping in the
Sea of Japan exemplifies this preference for immediate short-term
solutions whose consequences are not fully thought out.31 For
substantive policy change to occur, the domestic groundwork must
be laid first. It must then be consistently implemented and
articulated throughout the state, including the corridors of the
Ministry of Defense. Clearly that is not yet the case.
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Gorbachev effected such a strategic resolution in Russia's
Asian policy by building on the already developing inclination
towards rapprochement with China that began in 1981-82. But to
break through to meet China's three conditions: leaving
Afghanistan, terminating support for Vietnam's war in Cambodia,
and demilitarizing the Sino-Russian border, he had to oust
hardliners and appoint men more inclined to rapprochement and
normalization with China. Bureaucratic restructuring, and changed
ideological perceptions, were essential preconditions for the
very successful China policy that Shevarnadze called the regime's
most important achievement in international affairs.32 These
personnel and policy changes allowed leading officials and
spokesmen to argue that China and the USSR stood at the same
level of domestic development and confronted similar issues of
reform. Since their domestic agendas were `synchronized' they now
could come to terms with each other to improve mutual
understanding.33 Congruent domestic political and ideological
perspectives made for congruent foreign policies according to
Gorbachev's pro-reform spokesmen.34 Admittedly this was a
simplistic analysis, especially after Tiananmen Square, but it
does show that transformations in the bureaucracy and conceptual
framework of Soviet elites had to precede a decisive turn in
policy.
This precept is no less valid today. Russia's continuing
unrest prevents it from making a decisive break with the past and
perpetuates older uncertainties and insecurities. Many have
observed a discernible and ongoing swing to the right. Certainly
if reforms are blocked the "military first" approach will grow
even stronger than it currently is. Then Siberia and the Far East
will still be seen in military, not economic, terms. Asian policy
will perpetuate the antique Leninist perception that Russia
exists in a state of more or less total war with all its
neighbors. While alliances are possible, indeed necessary, policy
will be geared to military security first and economics second.
Economic policy will be based on its military utility.
Unfortunately many domestic forces in Russia are pushing for
a primarily military-oriented view in Asian policy. Their efforts
can be seen in the continuing rapprochement with China. This
rapprochement is especially visible in the arms sales to China
and military pressure for an actual alliance with it. Such an
alliance would continue hostility to Japan and suspicion of the
United States. And, at home, such a posture means delaying
economic reform or even devising a program to answer economic
needs of the Maritime Provinces and Asiatic Russia. This pressure
is often expressed in ideological terms that reflect, first of
all, domestic policy struggles. Former Prime Minister Ryzhkov's
interview in a Chinese newspaper was then reprinted in the trade
union newspaper, Trud, a conservative publication. Ryzhkov
masqueraded as an early supporter of market reforms, but derided
the current reform efforts as "blind copying of the U.S.
economy." Rather, with due accounting for the differences between
them, Russia should more attentively follow China's path.35
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Advocacy of the "Chinese model" is an indicator that separates
reformers from conservatives or reactionaries. Ryzhkov's
"rehabilitation," so to speak, is also an indicator in the
domestic struggle.
The Resolution: Russia's Security Concepts and Asia.
However, the most prominent and consequential indicators of
policy trends towards Asia are the security concept composed by
the Security Council in May 1993 and accepted by Yeltsin, and the
Defense Doctrine, whose "Basic Principles" were published in
November 1993. The Security Council paper advances an expansive
view of Russian objectives and threats to Russia. Russia, it
concludes, is a great power due to its potential and actual
influence on world affairs. It is responsible not only for the
new world order since 1991 but also for the creation of the
system of relations among the former Soviet republics. Russia is,
therefore, the guarantor of that system's stability. Any threat
to integration of the CIS, a fundamental political goal (and one
that can only mean integration around Russia, an inherently
expansive and quasi-imperial concept), is a threat. Russia must
play a greater role in international organizations to ward off
such threats.36 The economic threat is that the country may be
relegated to an inferior industrial status and a long-term
colonial position as a purveyor of fuels and raw materials which
cannot compete in global markets.37 This viewpoint reaffirms the
Leninist belief and Soviet economic policy that the world economy
is a zero-sum game. This deep-rooted, autarkic and nationalist
reflex inhibited fruitful economic intercourse abroad for nearly
75 years.
This Security Council paper naturally reflects Russia's
primacy in international relations between itself and the United
States in Asia and Europe. That primacy is based on common
interests in strategic stability, nuclear nonproliferation, and
prevention of regional conflicts. The concept paper then sets
forth a hierarchical order of the countries of importance to
Russia in the Asian-Pacific region.
. . . our foreign policy priorities include the
development of balanced and stable relations with
all countries, especially such key states as the US,
China, Japan, and India, and the establishment of
multilateral cooperation in strengthening security.
In this context, it is urgent to consolidate the
breakthrough achieved in relations with China--from
our standpoint--the region's most important state in
geopolitical and economic terms.38
The paper obviously denigrates Japan's largely economic
power even as it states that progress towards normalization is
very important. Searching for that goal by resolving the
territorial issue is expedient but should not be done to the
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detriment of Russia's interests.39 The stress on China, and the
downgrading of Japan and India, are logically related.
Partnership with China eliminates the essential reason for the
former Indo-Soviet alliance, an anti-Chinese move to encircle and
constrain China.40 Russo-Indian relations must find a new footing
and basis for amity other than shared democracy. The new line of
concentrating on China has overturned the old friendship with
India. Now it will be based on a common democratic ethos and,
more prosaically, shared anti-Islamic security concerns in
Central Asia, a factor that also aligns both states' interests in
the region with China's.41 A basically militarized view, with its
stress on military threats also contributes to the downgrading of
Japan, an economic power, and of economic relationships in
general. The Security Council's view of economic threats to
Russia evinces suspicion of Japan and of foreign investment in
general. It also reveals an inherent contradiction of the
militarizing view.
On the one hand, Russia must be as self-sufficient as
possible and produce at contemporary industrial and
post-industrial levels to sustain its Asian position. At the same
time, Asiatic Russia must remain the raw material base for that
program. The most promising region in Russia for international
economic integration and Russia's `leap forward' is sacrificed to
being the same kind of domestic colony that policymakers fear
Russia as a whole might become. The government's fundamental
inattention to a vigorous expansion of Russia's Far Eastern
economic position can also be found in the Draft Foreign Economic
Policy Concept of October 1993. It states that the Far East still
accounts for less than 20 percent of exports and imports. In
1993, trends towards a growth of Russian exports, notably
machinery and engineering products, became visible and should be
encouraged. But it simultaneously notes that the most significant
partners in commodity turnover are a small group of European
countries who import Russian energy products and export
machinery, equipment and consumer goods back to Russia. Hence,
The strategic task of foreign economic policy in the
1990s is an expansion of the geography of foreign
economic activity, primarily to countries of Asia
and America and also the restoration of ties to the
former members of CEMA.42
Logically, that guideline should lead to expanded ties with
Japan, but those are ruled out on political grounds. Therefore,
Asiatic Russia is consigned to the traditional position of raw
material appendage and exporter and its industrial development is
retarded. That foreign trade guideline would be in full and
unresolved contradiction to the security concept unless economic
ties with China took precedence over trade with Japan. But it is
hardly clear that China needs Russian energy products or raw
materials or will pay for them in cash. Indeed, there are already
complaints that China is exploiting Russia by not paying in
quality goods or cash for those products.43 Thus it is more than
10

likely from a policy standpoint that any substantial increase in
exports to Asia in general, and to China in particular, will take
the form of raw materials, arms, and military technology. That
prospect is not an encouraging one for either Russian or Asian
security.
Logically this outcome means that Siberia and the Maritime
Provinces will be the cash cow whose proceeds are exported abroad
for currency and equipment to rebuild the industrial and
post-industrial plant. The antinomies of the security concept can
only be reconciled if these provinces remain Moscow's domestic
colonies. That outcome would reinforce the existing regional
divisions of labor and economic specialization that lie at the
root of the Far East's rising political dissatisfaction with
Moscow.44 Moscow contemplates no fundamental reorganization of
the area's economic structure even if it is the `gateway' to the
world market. Yeltsin will continue Gorbachev's policy which
talked a good game about international integration but did little
or nothing to achieve it.45 Despite high-level discussion of
schemes to convert the region's military industrial production to
civilian purposes, and open its extractive and other industries
to foreign participation, it is unlikely this will happen on a
large scale. Moscow remains determined to control events and
processes there because of the high level of economic uncertainty
that plagues all of Russia, even if it thereby increases the
risks to domestic stability.46
Notwithstanding talk of change, the Department of Foreign
Economic Relations within the Council of Ministers has already
reported that for years to come Russia "will hardly be able to
play a significant role in the system of international economic
relations of the entire region, and its priorities will basically
be concentrated in the directions of Northeast Asia."47 Russia
will continue accepting the current pattern of Asian economic
stratification and implicitly write off Southeast Asia, the
fastest growing sector of the world economy. Given such outlooks
and myopia, the persistence of past policies is not surprising.
A Vladivostok-based analysis of the region in the military
press reflected the militarizing approach's underlying
assumptions about the economic position of Asiatic Russia even as
it decried the region's continued backwardness. The authors cited
the lack of a coherent government plan for economic reform,
Russia's continuing exclusion from many foreign markets in
industry due to the cold war, the concentration on
labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive industries oriented
towards high productivity and exports, and the fundamental
uncompetitiveness of any products brought into being by
converting regional military-industrial complexes to civilian
production. Those industries were tailored specifically to local
needs and are not competitive elsewhere.
Thus, under any economic system, the region holds little
attraction for foreign investors. Nor is preserving the existing
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regional structure of production advantageous even in a
developing market economy. According to this analysis, Western
proposals and demands, as well as demands to repay debts, mean
that East-West opposition still exists in economics. Disarmament
proposals also only lead to unilateral disarmament against
Russia's national interest. No economic miracle will take place
here nor is one intended. It follows that the region will remain
primarily Russia's military advance post on Asia and the Pacific
Ocean, not a window to Asia's economy.48
It is not coincidence that this analysis was published in
Vladivostok's military newspaper, Krasnaya Znamya (Red Banner),
and fully reflects the militarizing view. It postulates a
continuing cold war in economics and international relations, a
plot by others to suppress Russia, as well as the view that
military conversion is fruitless, etc. As such it shares with the
security concept and the militarized approach many implicit, and
perhaps explicit, assumptions about the APR.
The defense doctrine published in November 1993 consolidates
those concepts in a policy context. That context has been most
commented upon for Europe and the Near Abroad. Typically and
wrongly, its implications for Russia's strategic posture in Asia
are ignored by analysts except for Aleksei Arbatov. The doctrine
also displays the military's regained supremacy in the sphere of
threat assessment and policy after its trials under Gorbachev. It
was wholly designed by the military and then rushed through the
cabinet by Yeltsin who then approved it. Thus it reflects a
decidedly one-sided approach to Russian security issues. Of
particular relevance in Asia are statements about nuclear
options, dangers, and threats to Russia. Those threats are:
• Territorial claims by other states on Russia,
• Existing and potential local wars around Russia's borders;
• Possible use of weapons of mass destruction;
• Proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction and delivery systems, and state-of-the-art production
techniques in conjunction with certain states, organizations, and
terrorists to fulfill their military and political aspirations;
• Threats to strategic stability by a violation of
international arms treaties;
• Attempts to destabilize the Russian Federation or
interfere in its internal affairs;
• Suppression of the rights, freedom, and interests of
Russian citizens in foreign states;
• Attacks on Russian military installations abroad; and,
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• Expansion of military blocs and alliances against the
interests of Russia's security.49
Those dangers become threats when forces are built up on
Russia's borders to the point of disrupting the correlation of
forces or of attacking installations and the border. Similarly,
threats also appear when troops are trained for action in Russia
or its allies' territory, actions are taken that hinder Russian
strategic systems for supporting nuclear forces, state military
C2 or, above all, their space component, and foreign troops are
introduced without U.N. sanction into neighboring states.50
According to Russian doctrine, if Russian command and
control, nuclear, chemical, power, or electric installations are
attacked, even by conventional weapons, Russia will consider
first use of nuclear weapons. As the doctrine states, Russia will
not use strategic systems against a nonnuclear party to the
nonproliferation treaty of 1968 unless it participates as an ally
with a state having nuclear weapons or carries out joint actions
with that state in support of an invasion of Russia, its
territory, armed forces, other troops, or allies.51 Thus the
doctrine extends nuclear deterrence throughout the CIS, even if
it has not been formally requested by a CIS member in an alliance
with Russia. Lieutenant General Valery Manilov, Deputy Secretary
of the Security Council, confirms that,
Russia retains the right to make a first nuclear
strike against territories, troops, or military
installations of an aggressor state even if the
latter does not possess nuclear weapons but is under
the "nuclear umbrella" of some ally or
military-political bloc.52
As Arbatov observes, these "nuclear first" threats and
expansive definition of dangers and threats to Russia certainly
cannot apply to the United States or NATO, or have only limited
utility there. Obviously they are directed against Ukraine and
Central European states wishing to join NATO. But in Asia these
provisions are clearly aimed at Japan, which, even if it only
supports exclusively conventional U.S. forces in operations
against Russia, is vulnerable to nuclear strikes. Moreover,
China, too, is supposedly deterred from theater conventional
operations against Russia by this threat of a nuclear response.
This is particularly threatening to China which, alone of nuclear
states, publicly adheres to the doctrine of no first strike.
Should China wake up to the threat implicit in this document and
realize that Russia's nuclear strategy is directed against it, it
could follow suit and revise its doctrine. This is especially the
case since its forces will be inferior to those of Russia and the
United States for the next 10-15 years.53 In that case nuclear
containment in the Far East will fail, or will be more likely to
do so.54 But China can only become a threat to Russia if Russia
continues providing it with high quality conventional weapons and
technology.55 Russian military men discount this possibility even
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though it happened in the 1960s. Instead, they point to the
current nuclear nonaggression pact negotiated in early 1994 by
Foreign Minister Kozyrev.56
In other words, the military perspective that stresses
nuclear first scenarios and holds that China is the most
important country to both deter and be friendly with, is
inherently contradictory. This doctrine, with its expansive
requirements for defense against very expanded threat
assessments, will not assure nonproliferation or strategic
stability in Asia, but will lead instead to more military dead
ends.
The Strategic Bases of Russia's Emerging Asian Policy.
Nevertheless we must understand the foundations of this
approach to Russia's Asian posture to explain its durability and
seeming rationality. There is no doubt that the China first
approach comprises tremendous support across all Russian
political life.57
As in the past, Russia faces two potential military threats
in Asia: one from the land and one from the sea (both, of course,
include aerial warfare). Unquestionably the land threat from
China, particularly through Manchuria and Mongolia, is the most
dangerous. That was the case even before the advent of nuclear
weapons. The strategic competitions with the United States and
with China only magnified that danger. China, or forces based
there, threaten the entire strategic depth of Asiatic Russia and
threaten to sever it from European Russia by interdicting any
means of transport to and from European Russia. The weakness of
communications with European Russia was, and remains, the primary
strategic Achilles heel of the Russian position in Asia.58
Therefore a threat from China, whether Chinese in origin or from
a foreign occupier or ally of China, compromised Russia's
European strategic position. The nightmare of coalitions, of a
two or three front war, especially in an area that was weakly
tied to Russia and could not feed itself, but was regarded as
both a raw material treasure house and the envy of others, has
obligated Russian governments always to make sure that either
hostile forces did not dominate China, or that they were somehow
tied down or contained.59 Ideally the way to do this, as after
1937, was to incite Sino-Japanese rivalry or at least distance
them from each other so that the two states could not coalesce.
This is because the second threat in Asia was the Japanese
sea-based one, a threat that was also profoundly magnified once
the United States used Japan as a forward base. That threat
became still greater with the advent of sea-launched nuclear
weapons on both sides. That development made the Far East still
more of a defensive bastion for Russia because it became home
port for many of its SSBNs and a lucrative target for the United
States (especially when horizontal escalation scenarios enjoyed a
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certain vogue in Washington). It became ever more necessary for
Russia to deter, if not contain, Japan as well as China and the
United States and to maintain naval superiority in the waters in
and around Japan lest they become a platform for strikes upon the
USSR.60 Under Brezhnev it became necessary for the USSR to
intimidate, encircle, or contain China and threaten Japan by
concentrating heavy strategic and conventional forces in the
area. The unfortunate and wholly logical outcome was that, with
U.S. blessing, China and Japan came to terms in 1978 creating
maximum peril for Moscow. Thanks to the stubborn policy of
antagonizing everyone in Asia, Moscow stimulated an anti-Soviet
coalition comprising U.S. strategic and conventional forces,
China and Japan with the last two being potential forward bases
for those forces.61 While this prospect led some to consider a
policy of tous azimuts (defense in all directions) against
everyone in Asia, that proved to be insupportable.62 Therefore,
after 1982, Moscow opted for normalization first with China, and
in 1986-87 in an overall detente with the United States. Thus the
Chinese `card' remains central to Moscow today precisely because
it is the greatest threat to Russia and the most unpredictable
state in the region. Moscow's strategic doctrine is clearly aimed
at it and Japan. According to Aleksei Arbatov, China is the enemy
against whom theater conventional scenarios and war games are
programmed.63
Japan alone is not too great a threat as long as it is
restricted by the United States. Accordingly, Moscow now supports
the alliance relationship between those two states provided it is
made into a still larger collective security pact including
Russia.64 More precisely we find another traditional policy that
relies on the United States to contain Japan. Tsarist, Soviet,
and now Russian leaders count on such a containment due to the
alliance between the United States and Japan. Or they seek to
exploit the competitive relationship those two states now have,
and have had regarding economic and political issues in Asia. The
tactic of exploiting U.S.-Japanese "contradictions" dates back to
Count Sergei Witte at the Portsmouth treaty negotiations in 1905.
He first outlined the notion, later adopted by Lenin and Stalin,
that U.S. pressure would prevent Japan from either having a free
hand to attack Vladivostok or to dominate China.65 Today, too,
the purpose of U.S.-Russian partnership in Asia is not just to
prevent regional or global tensions that could lead to another
cold war. Rather Moscow aspires to play a triangular game with
Washington and Tokyo so Japan cannot act freely in Asia.
At the same time, U.S. policymakers have long understood (at
least since Theodore Roosevelt) that "It is best [that Russia]
should be left face to face with Japan so that each may have a
moderating action on the other."66 Washington also understands
this logic. In 1993 the United States supported Japan on the
issue of the Southern Kuriles, knowing full well that this
support would not lead to a treaty with Moscow, and reaffirming
its position in Tokyo. At the same time the United States
compelled Japan to pay for Russian reform against its will and
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thus undermined the linkage of economics and politics that had
been at the heart of Japanese strategy towards Russia. In this
way it manipulated the triangle while preserving a partnership
with Russia and Russo-Japanese tension.
U.S. policymakers have long understood the strategic
rationales governing Soviet and Russian policy in Asia and
Moscow's need to find some way to relieve the economic and
strategic pressure on Russia's position there. In mid-1947,
Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in the
western Pacific wrote,
If the Soviet position in the [Russian] maritime
provinces is not integrated to the industrial and
agricultural support of Manchuria, not supported by
the strategic reinforcement of warm water ports of
Port Arthur, Dairen, and northern Korea, and is
forced to continue to be dependent upon a line of
supplies over the Trans-Siberian railway, the
maritime province position continues to be a source
of weakness and vulnerability to Russia . . . If,
however, Soviet eastern Asia becomes self-sufficient
. . . Soviet Asia can then become an element of
strength in the over-all Soviet power structure.67
In 1949, George Kennan wrote that the security of Japan,
India, Southeast Asia, and Australia depended "in large measure
on the denial of SEA to the Kremlin."68
Denying the sea to the Kremlin meant bottling up its navy on
Russia's Pacific Coast and using Japan and South Korea as forward
bases for U.S. forces in Asia. This policy incorporated the
Russo-Japanese bilateral rivalry dating back to 1894 into the
very structure of the cold war in Asia. Clearly, Washington has
long understood the necessity of preserving Russo-Japanese
tensions and contradictions just as Moscow understood the need to
keep Japan and China at bay and Japan and the United States from
assuming belligerent anti-Russian postures.
Since Manchuria and northern China, in particular, are the
zones by which Russian land may be menaced, and because Russian
forces are continually at risk because of a weak logistical,
transport, and communications base; Russian military power in the
area has faced two alternatives. Either it became wholly
self-sufficient to preserve the structural regional division of
labor until such time as massive investment succeeded in
overcoming the inherent handicaps in Russia's posture; or, on the
other hand, Russia had to rely on foreign investment to develop
the area economically or provide logistical support in wartime.
This adds another rationale for collaboration with the United
States or, today, with China as economic partner in the region.
This is especially so given Japanese reluctance to invest heavily
in Asian Russia. Jacob Kipp has shown that in World War II the
Soviet Manchurian operation was logistically impossible without
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extensive time to transport men, platforms, and supplies over
vast distances using U.S.-supplied transportation systems and the
U.S. Navy.69 U.S. military pressure, i.e., its threat to invade
Japan or Manchuria, also diverted the Kwantung Army and Tokyo
from paying full attention to the implications of Russia's
buildup or contesting it. Today too, it is only by partnership
with China and America that Russia can defuse current and
potential future threats to its exposed position in Asia.
More clearly than ever, Asia is militarily an economy of
force theater that must defend itself exclusively by its own
resources. Equally clear is that today Russian strategic and
conventional forces are thereby linked as mutually supportive
forces for a bastion, not a jumping off point (at least for years
to come). Indeed, the START II Treaty makes the strategic value
of the SSNs and SSBNs ever greater and further justifies a tough
position towards Japan on the Southern Kurile Islands.70 Both
Russian and U.S. officials well know that the regional role of
the United States as constrainer of Japan, Russia, or China does
not end with the demise of the USSR. If anything, it increases
even as regional actors' definition of security expands into
civilian, economic areas.71 Paradoxically the START II Treaty
will consolidate the strategic restraint of Japan by making
control of the seas around Russian Asia and their denial to the
United States and Japan more vital.
The treaty makes Russia's navy a more important guardian of
strategic stability inasmuch as SSBNs will carry over 50 percent
of nuclear warheads. But the threat to those SSBNs can grow due
to improvements in conventional means of strategic antisubmarine
warfare (ASW). Russian defense specialists and naval officers
told a U.S. research team from the Center for Naval Analysis:
The model of nuclear deterrence in the Cold War
demanded a constant threat to the nuclear forces of
the other side. Currently such a threat is also
borne by precision-guided munitions (PGMs). ASW is
more important in this sphere, where the United
States has clear-cut superiority. Within the limits
of START II, the United States could jeopardize
strategic stability if its ASW capabilities were
used to the fullest. Nuclear strategic submarines,
formerly considered the most invulnerable elements
of the deterrent, can be the most vulnerable if the
United States tries to fully utilize its ASW
superiority. The threat of destruction of strategic
nuclear weapons by conventional means--i.e. ASW--can
force Russia to decide to use them before they lose
them.72
This analysis perfectly accords with the defense doctrine's
nuclear first postulates. In the Asia-Pacific Region the threat
to SSBNs which have been removed to their home ports becomes all
the more crucial, particularly since the Russian Navy expects the
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United States will deploy ASW forces and initiate operations
against their SSBNs early in the conflict if not in its initial
phase. Whether the threat comes from SSNs or conventional ASW is
immaterial; Russian SSBNs in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan must
be protected by multiple barriers. Those include submarines,
surface ships, carrier air, shore- based aircraft, sensors, also
space-based sensors, and, prospectively, strike systems.73 A
recent Russian study of its future navy observes that these
factors make ASW issues central to strategic stability and make
the forward deployment of U.S. ASW systems a constant source of
tension in bilateral relations.74 This means that the Southern
Kuriles must be retained since the alternative would mean not
just forward basing of those ASW forces in Japan but in the
islands themselves.
For these reasons the authors of this study want to
demilitarize the entire area as part of confidence-building
measures.75 Then, and only then, would transfer of the islands
not enhance threats to Russian security.76 Their call for CBMs
leading towards demilitarization of the area indicate the
powerful obstacle that the Russian Navy, General Staff, and
Ministry of Defense make up when the return of the Southern
Kurile Islands comes on the agenda, and the main reason for the
security proposals discussed above. And it underpins the
political rationale of bringing in the United States to deter or
constrain Japan. For only when the United States is able and
willing both to restrain Japan and to demilitarize the Northwest
Pacific, would those elites feel secure. Russian SSBNs, SSNs,
strategic ASW, and conventional forces would then be infinitely
more secure in their bastions. For that reason, even under
today's friendly atmosphere, it is most unlikely that the U.S.
Navy will accept that range of CBMs because then it will have
lost its capability to deny the sea to the Russians, something
that has been its task for almost 50 years. Given the strength of
the Mahanian legacy in the U.S. Navy, it is difficult to see it
foregoing that option. But as long as the U.S. Navy maintains its
strategic mission of denying the sea to Russia, Russian military
leaders will insist that the islands remain the key to the
Pacific Fleet's bastion and therefore will remain locked. These
reasons for the status quo (and they are hardly new ones or even
unknown to the Russian military), preclude anything like the
nightmare scenarios proposed below by Russian military analysts
from happening.
These strategic considerations underlie the Russian armed
forces' staunch refusal to contemplate yielding the islands and
explain their intervention into the policy debate in 1992-93.
However, the continuation of this militarized approach to Asia
makes it all but impossible to improve relations with Japan while
entailing a heavy economic-political price. First, Marshal
Shaposhnikov, as Minister of Defense, admitted that no such U.S.
threat existed.77 Second, nor can the scenario of Japan fighting
Russia for the United States be supported inasmuch as Japanese
defense spending is declining. Third, others claim that if the
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islands were returned, Japan alone could then bottle up Russian
naval forces in their home ports. These scenarios do not make
sense unless we can explain the opposition to rapprochement with
Japan and cession of the islands in a way that goes beyond these
contradictory and illogical propositions outlined by Shaposhnikov
and other figures.
The means for doing so can be found in Soviet/Russian
military writings and analysis of their regional doctrine and
strategy. First, Soviet military writing has in the past
exhibited the same kind of contradictory and hence closed
perspective on improving relations with an enemy state, namely
Israel. During the early 1970s, the military press argued that
Israel would never withdraw from lands conquered in 1967, but
also postulated that such withdrawal was a condition sine qua non
for peace. Since this circle was closed, war was the only option
except for the fact that Soviet military power deterred such an
option. Thus, by a process of elimination, military organs and
considerations became the primary vehicles of regional Soviet
policy in the Near East.78 Indeed, this conceptual tradition goes
back at least to Tsarist officials writing in the 1880s-90s about
the Far East (then called Priamur'e). A recent study on the
Trans-Siberian railroad, Russia's main overland link to the
region, concludes,
Paradoxically, at the same time that the Russian
General Staff saw Priamur'e as the source of
Russia's weakness and ineffectiveness in the Far
East, its members were under the impression that it
gave Russia preeminence in the Pacific and made the
rest of the world envious enough to plan its joint
conquest.79
Secondly, Soviet military objectives against Japan which
were published in early 1991 have probably not been significantly
revised. The documents state that in the event of war with Japan
the forces in the Pacific TVD (theater of strategic military
actions) have the following goals:
• Control the waters surrounding Russia including the Seas
of Japan and Okhotsk;
• Prevent U.S. naval strikes by searching for, detecting,
and destroying U.S. naval forces at sea;
• Maintain a nuclear launch capability against the United
States and enemy forces and installations in the region;
• Deter China from entry into the war;
• Gain control over key channels in the region.80
These objectives underscore the central importance of the
Southern Kurile Islands as guardians of the entry into the Seas
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of Japan and Okhotsk. Russian strategy demands that Russia alone
be able to come and go in these waters. Therefore the threat from
Japan and the United States is two-sided. One side is that they,
not Russia, will be able to use those islands and waters to
bottle up the fleet and thus launch strikes against Russia from
fleet to shore. Alternatively they prevent Moscow's forces from
going out to sea and engaging enemy forces far forward, as called
for in classic Soviet doctrine. The need to preserve SSBNs
against ASW in the initial phase of any conflict, as we saw
above, also imposes a requirement for first, even preemptive use
of nuclear and conventional forces to stop the ASW threat.81 Even
under the desperate circumstances presently obtaining in the
navy, its commanders, and evidently the MOD, are unwilling to let
go of the perspectives embodied in this mission hierarchy. Naval
spokesmen mince no words about how they see their defensive
mission whether in the Pacific theater or elsewhere.
CINC Admiral Feliks Gromov, Admiral Kasatonov, and Chief of
Staff Admiral V. Selivanov all list strategic deterrence as the
navy's primary mission, along with retaining a high readiness and
capability to defend Russian assets and to strike at the enemy's
key installations. This deterrence and defense of Russian assets
and interests must also take place, first of all, in seas
contiguous to Russia.82 The navy must deploy far forward and
attack enemies there to deny them platforms and strike
capabilities in the distant oceans and in the waters near Russia.
In Northeast Asia, the near approaches are the Seas of Japan and
Okhotsk which must perforce be exclusive Russian military
domains. Ceding the islands compromises the entire strategic and
operational doctrine of Russia's Pacific Fleet and also opens up
the ground forces to long-range naval and air attacks which they
cannot avert by their own assets. Russian strategy and
operational art in this theater labors under the shadow of modern
naval war and its technology, the unfavorable geographical
problem posed by Japan's and Korea's location astride major
waterways, and their ability to bottle up the Russian fleet
there. Long-range naval and air missiles, especially SLCMs, have
long been perceived by Moscow as the main threat. To avert that
threat, Russian forces must engage enemy platforms far forward
before they can get into range to fire.
Russian doctrine has inherited the Soviet view that air
superiority is the precondition for naval superiority and that
air superiority, as demonstrated in Iraq, can determine the
course if not outcome of the war. Therefore, it is essential that
Moscow create an impregnable air defense umbrella over its
Pacific Fleet to prevent long-range strikes against its ships and
platforms. Ceding the islands allows for enemy strike platforms
to close in. For Russia to defend its submarine and surface
vessel "bastions" in the Pacific it must, even now, strive to
expand its naval and air defense umbrella, deployment potential,
and strike capability. In the Far East Moscow must consistently
aim at expanding its defense envelope, especially air and sea,
against missiles and other strikes, a military policy which
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inescapably means creating a naval, air and air defense umbrella
over Japan and the Korean peninsula.83 For this reason, the
decision to mothball and phase out Russia's Kiev class aircraft
carriers and the VSTOL Yak-38 Forgers is a sharp blow to the
Pacific Fleet, but will probably make its commanders more adamant
about these islands.84 What Russian military men prefer is
expressed in the notion, dating back to 1946, of a limited TVD
where Russian forces exercise exclusive control or command of the
sea, particularly that region which is vital to the conduct of
operations or where operations will occur. Such control also
entails freedom of movement to conduct the operation. The greater
the long-range threat, the larger the envelope of this limited
TVD and the dominion exercised by Russian forces must then be.85
Accordingly the general military perspective of the Russian
armed forces, expressed by its fleet commanders and the CIS
Minister of Defense, inevitably puts Russia on a geostrategic
collision course with Japan. Relations should be improved by all
means, if possible, but no strategic assets, certainly not the
Southern Kuriles, can be given up since they will inevitably
become a base or platform for enemy action. Precisely because
Japan appeared as an enemy decreed by fate, military leaders, who
were impressed by the use of the military to restore order in
1989, became enthusiastic proponents of an alliance with China
against Japan on ideological and strategic grounds.86 This
alliance is expressed in admiration for Chinese reforms, powerful
support for Russian arms sales that, inter alia, place pressure
on Japan, and political links among military officials.
The Consequences of Russia's New Policies.
Today the militarizing approach with its China first policy
has won out and determines Russian policy in Asia. Relations with
Asia's other states fall into place because of this. In Central
and South Asia, China and Russia share a common interest in
stabilizing the situation so that Islamic or other forms of
ethnonational assertiveness do not arise either in Central Asia
or Sinkiang.87 Regarding India, in 1986 Gorbachev told the
Indians that the Soviet Union was going to improve ties with
China and that India should also do so.88 Today India is far down
on the list of Russian priorities except insofar as Central Asia
and arms sales are concerned because Russia is allied (Kozyrev's
word) to China.89 Thus India, which regards China as a strategic
threat, has had to come to terms with it.
Southeast Asia's interest to Russia also is substantially
downgraded from the 1980s. Essentially it has only a marginal
economic interest even though Kozyrev talked to ASEAN as if
Russia still had a strategic interest there.90 But Russia will do
nothing to jeopardize vital Chinese interests although it hopes
not to have to take a stand. Its silence in 1988 over the
incidents in the Spratly Islands when Sino-Vietnamese fighting
broke out exemplifies that policy. While Russia sees the area as
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a lucrative entrepot for trade, particularly in weapons, it is
only a player by courtesy in local security dialogues. Yet the
aggressive effort to trade and sell weapons there ultimately
contradicts its policy toward China because Chinese doctrine and
force structure is clearly oriented to local regional wars of
power projection into Southeast Asia and its maritime
territories.91 Thus Russian policy, governed by the militarizing
approach, risks having to choose between China and its neighbors
to the south.
The Russo-Chinese bilateral relationship is now a nonaggression pact. Article IV of the bilateral treaty announced on
December 18, 1992, stated that,
Both parties will not participate in any form of
political or military alliance which is directed
against the other party, and will not conclude any
form of treaty of agreement with a third country
which jeopardizes the national sovereignty and the
security interest of the respective other party; no
party shall allow a third country to use its
territory in a manner which threatens the national
sovereignty and the national security interest of
the other party.92
And the nuclear nonaggression pact of 1994 corrects the
loophole in Russia's nuclear doctrine and goes further along the
line of the 1992 treaty.93 First, in regard to Central Asia and
India, both parties are freed from the prospect that the other
might intervene should Islamic or other nationalism create a
conflict within or near their borders. Second, India and Vietnam
are deprived of Russian support against China. For Moscow, this
treaty also relieves fears of a joint land and sea anti-Russian
conflict, i.e., the nightmare of coalitions in Asia. Third, it
makes for joint cooperation in any conflict in Korea because it
frees China (and Russia) from worrying about a second front in
the north should it have to come to Pyongyang's aid (not
something it wants to do anyway). Moreover, the alliance prevents
the DPRK from playing both sides against the middle and fits in
as well with both sides' interests in improving relations with
South Korea and obtaining the large economic benefits thereof.
From Russia's viewpoint, good ties to Seoul are an additional
card against Japan. They are part of the continuing anti-Japan
orientation of policy as well as a check upon North Korea and a
link to the United States.94 Finally, for both states, the treaty
creates a permanent pressure on Japan which drives it back to
dependence on Washington, exactly what Moscow and Beijing want to
perpetuate. Thus this alliance makes eminent strategic sense.
However, there are negative sides to it. First, it is by no
means clear or certain that Russia must have bad relations with
Tokyo to have good ones with Beijing. That locks Russia into a
self-perpetuating cycle of enmity with Japan and deprives it of
entree into the explosive Asia-Pacific economy. China cannot
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substitute for Japan in this regard as it engages Russia mainly
in barter trade and has been accused already of sharp dealing and
inferior goods in return for arms.95 China has no interest either
in building up Russia's economic position, and its business
classes are no more attracted to the chaos of Russian economics
than is anyone else. Thus by leaning to one side Russia pays a
heavy price for security in Asia. Another consideration is that
Russian elites harbor, for all the protestation of friendship, a
noticeable ambivalence, if not atavistic fear of China. This
alliance is at best a temporary marriage of convenience. That is
especially the case inasmuch as China will undergo a profound
leadership crisis, and probably many political upheavals as its
economic reforms deepen and intensify. Russia, the closer it is
to any one faction or government in China, will not be able to
extricate itself easily from a potentially unpredictable
situation. Enmity may quickly come to replace amity.
Excessive closeness to China robs Russia of flexibility in
policy as it has to keep one eye on China before pursuing any
other interests. By virtue of the sizable uncontrolled military
exchange of weapons, scientists or technologies to China for
barter or cash, factions inside Russian politics might also be
unduly influenced by particularistic and short-term
considerations of Chinese desires rather than by a Russian
national interest. Factionalism on both sides of the relationship
that commingled internal rivalries with foreign ones or with
mutual friendship is a long and unfinished story. Thus Russia's
Communist Party places strong emphasis on friendship with China.
Were it or Vladamir Zhirinovsky and other right-wing factions to
come to power, this leaning to one side could prove very
dangerous to Russia.
Finally, as suggested above, the excessively close ties to
China reinforce the dominance over the security policy process of
precisely the people who adhere to traditional Soviet positions
that inhibit reform and democracy at home. The longer the
militarizing approach remains dominant, the longer Russia will
see its interests in the light of permanent hostility from other
states. Accordingly, the military-industrial complex will retain
its hegemony in Russian politics, particularly if it can receive
large amounts of cash for contributing to Asian arms
proliferation.96 Just as the United States should be seeking to
restrain Russian imperial ambitions in Europe, so too should it
remember that we seek to do it in Asia as well. As noted in the
beginning of this monograph, it is all too easy for American
analysts and officials to ignore the fact that Russia is an Asian
power. But we do so at our peril because we then avert our gaze
from important security developments in Asia and domestic trends
in Russia, both of which could rebound severely against us. While
it may be sound policy to let sleeping bears lie; it is
emphatically not sound policy to let sleeping guards do so.
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